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Abstract
We develop the notion of perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games where players may have in-
finitely many types and actions. We formulate and examine several definitions of perfection in
this setting using behavior strategies. The differences between the definitions arise from using
various notions of convergence such as uniform, pointwise and almost everywhere pointwise
convergence on the type space.
Additionally, we illustrate the use of perfect equilibrium in the context of a second-price auction
with incomplete information. In this auction, perfect equilibrium selects a unique equilibrium
in a class of pure separating strategy profiles. Thus, the selected equilibrium is the unique
pure strategy equilibrium in differentiable strategies that separates types. Moreover, when
informational uncertainty vanishes, the selected equilibrium converges to the classical truthful
dominant strategy equilibrium.
We also show that other, less intuitive, equilibria in which types are (partially) pooled are ruled
out by our selection criterion. We further argue that standard selection criteria for second-
price auctions, such as dominant strategy equilibrium or truthful bidding, have no bite in our
incomplete information example. Bidders have no dominant strategies when information is
incomplete, and the selected perfect separating equilibrium is not sincere.
JEL Codes. C72.
Keywords. Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Bayesian game with infinite type spaces, Behav-
ior strategy, Second-price auction with incomplete information.
∗e.bajoori@bath.ac.uk. University of Bath, Dept. of Economics, Bath, UK.
†j.flesch@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics, Dept. of Quan-
titative Economics, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
‡Corresponding author, d.vermeulen@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Maastricht University, School of Business and
Economics, Dept. of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht, The Netherlands., P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands.
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 1
1 Introduction
For normal form games with finite action spaces, Nash [16] introduced the concept of Nash equilib-
rium and proved its existence. Since Nash equilibria are not always intuitive as a solution, several
refinements of Nash equilibrium have been proposed in the literature. Among these, perfect equi-
librium (Selten [21]) is one of the most commonly used refinement concepts.
Many applications of Nash equilibrium and its refinements are in the context of incomplete infor-
mation games. Examples of games with incomplete information are signaling games (Kreps and
Wilson [12]), principal-agent models (Laffont and Martimort [13]), and models of reputation such
as the chain store paradox (Selten [22], Govindan [9]). In particular in auction design refinements
of Nash equilibrium are used to reduce the number of equilibria and rule out the less intuitive or
desirable equilibria. For example in the Vickrey auction, selection on dominant strategies singles
out the truthful equilibrium, and rules out the (many) ex post equilibria in which partial pooling
of types occurs. Also Jackson et al [10] employ perfect equilibrium in one of their examples to
eliminate equilibria in which players may bid above their maximum possible valuation.
Our aim is to develop the refinement of perfect equilibrium in the context of such applications,
in particular auction design. We focus on the game theoretic framework of Bayesian games, the
standard tool to model incomplete information. We study the class of Bayesian games in which
players, after the information phase in which they learn their type, play a one-shot game. We
develop the notion of perfect equilibrium for such games, and in effect we propose three possible
variations. We study the relations between these variations, and illustrate their use in the context
of a second price auction.
When applying refinements to auctions and incomplete information games there are typically two
problems to tackle. First, such games often feature discontinuities in the payoff functions. This
issue is addressed in for example Reny [19] and Jackson et al. [10].
Second, incomplete information games, especially auctions, often have continuum type spaces and
action spaces. Refinements for incomplete information games, such as for example sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson [12]) and perfect Bayesian equilbrium (Fudenberg and Tirole [8]),
are as a rule developed for finite games, and as such not immediately applicable in the context
of auction theory and similar economic applications with incomplete information. An influential
first attempt to generalize known equilibrium refinements to more general classes of games is the
working paper by Myerson and Reny [15]. Our paper also contributes to the development of
equilibrium refinement for incomplete information games, and generalizes the notion of perfect
equilibrium to the class of Bayesian games 1.
1The result in Myerson and Reny [15] covers a large class of incomplete information games. Their solution
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We take a conceptual view. A central solution concept in Bayesian games is that of Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE), a direct extension of Nash equilibrium to games with incomplete information.
A BNE is a profile of behavior strategies, one for each player, such that each player’s strategy, given
any type for this player, is an expected value maximizer given the strategies of his opponents, where
expectations are taken over all possible types of the opponents 2. So, the best response property
that characterizes the equilibrium concept is required at the interim stage when the player already
knows his own type 3.
In this paper we work with ex-interim probabilities, unless mentioned otherwise. Our goal is
to define the notion of perfect BNE in Bayesian games, analyze its properties, and illustrate its
predictive power in an elaborate example of a second price auction with incomplete information.
Our work is motivated by the observation that, under incomplete information, standard selection
criteria in auction design, such as dominant strategy equilibrium and truthful reporting, no longer
have a bite. Also notions such as sequential equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Kreps
and Wilson [12], Fudenberg and Tirole [8], Bonanno [6]) only have selective power in the context of
extensive form games with multiple rounds. Thus in the setting of single round sealed bid auctions
these refinements do not reduce the set of equilibria. According to the theory of refinements, the
selection criterion that best suits our context is perfect equilibrium. This is the solution concept
we develop for the class of Bayesian games.
We base our approach on completely mixed behavior strategies, i.e. behavior strategies which
prescribe a completely mixed probability measure for each possible type. We first define perfection
for general behavior strategy profiles, so not necessarily for BNEs yet. We define three versions
of perfection, which differ in the kind of convergence over the set of types. Roughly speaking,
a behavior strategy profile β is called perfect if there is a sequence (βk)∞k=1 of completely mixed
behavior strategy profiles such that, for every player i, the distance between βki and βi and the
distance between βki and player i’s best responses against β
k both converge to 0. We measure
distance on the set of actions by means of the weak metric. Convergence on the set of types is
expressed in one of the following three senses: uniformly for all types, pointwise for each type,
and for almost every type. Consequently, we call β uniform-perfect, pointwise-perfect, or a.e.-
pointwise-perfect. In general, such a profile β is not necessarily a BNE, since we did not impose
strong conditions on the type and actions spaces and on the payoff functions in the Bayesian game.
concept assigns finitely additive probability measures, while our construction remains within the environment of
countably additive probability measures.
2Behavior strategies are much in the spirit of Bayesian games. A behavior strategy of a player prescribes
a probability measure on his set of actions, depending on the type of this player, that satisfies an additional
measurability assumption. An alternative approach based on distributional strategies is investigated in Bajoori [4].
3A similar but weaker concept arises if one calculates ex-ante probabilities, and only requires the best response
property for each player before he receives his own type. This approach is investigated for example by Reny [20]
and by Milgrom and Weber [14].
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If β is also a BNE, then we call β a uniform-perfect, pointwise-perfect, or a.e.-pointwise-perfect
BNE, respectively.
In the first part of the paper we analyze each of these three notions of perfection in Bayesian
games in detail, and we discuss the relations between them. We also pay attention to special cases,
mainly when compactness is imposed on the type and action spaces or when the payoff functions
satisfy a continuity property. We also briefly discuss finite Bayesian games, i.e. when there are
only finitely many types and actions.
In the second part of the paper, we illustrate the use of perfection as a tool to select the more
intuitive BNEs in Bayesian games. We do so by examining a sealed-bid second-price auction with
two bidders. In this auction, the valuation function of each bidder does not only depend on his own
type, but also on the type of his opponent. More precisely, for each i = 1, 2, bidder i’s valuation
is given by vi = 5 + ti − αtj , where α ∈ (0, 1) and j = i. Jackson et al. [10] and [11] considered
the first price version of this auction with α = 4 and proved that no BNE exists if each player has
a positive probability to win in case of a tie.
This second-price auction admits multiple BNEs, but we find that perfection selects a BNE β
that is unique in a certain class of separating strategy profiles. We also show that perfection rules
out many BNEs in which pooling occurs among types. We highlight the subtleties involved in
the choice of sequence of completely mixed behavior strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1, because the most
straightforward candidate for this sequence, the uniform distribution, does not select a BNE.
We also show that standard complete information selection criteria such as dominant strategies
and truthful reporting do not apply here. Sincere reporting is not an equilibrium, the selected
BNE β is not sincere, and neither player has a dominant strategy in this auction. This emphasizes
the necessity to employ more sophisticated refinement techniques such as perfect BNE to select
among many BNEs in this auction.
As a final remark, we already observed that for example Reny [20] and Milgrom and Weber [14]
take an ex ante approach. However, both from a conceptual and a computational view, the ex
interim approach seems to be preferable. Conceptual, since perfect BNE is defined directly at the
level of behavioral strategies. Computational, since perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is calculated
at the level of the Bayesian game itself, not in the context of the induced strategic form game. Our
computations in the second price auction emphasize these observations.
RELATED LITERATURE. Simon and Stinchcombe [23] define perfect equilibrium for strategic form
games with compact action spaces. They discuss two essentially different appraoches. The first
approach is a direct generalization of Selten’s original definition, based on the notion of completely
mixed strategies. The second approach to perfect equilibrium, by Simon and Stinchcombe referred
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to as the finitistic approach, uses the notion of an ε-perfect equilibrium in finite approximations
of the original game. They show existence of these notions of perfect equilibrium, and investigate
the properties of and relations between the various resulting solution concepts.
Bajoori et al. [3] examine the two approaches proposed in Simon and Stinchcombe [23] in further
detail and provide an improved definition of the finitistic approach. Their results seem to imply a
critique on the finitistic approach.
Jackson et al. [10] study games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. In the in-
complete information setting discontinuities often arise from indifferences between players’ choices
and the particular resolution of such indifferences in the description of the game. The paper shows
in several examples that the resulting discontinuities may cause extreme behavior in equilibrium,
or even non-existence of equilibrium. They show that the introduction of a communication phase
before the start of the game may mitigate strategic effects, and restore existence of equilibrium
with truthful reporting.
Reny [20] shows, under general conditions, the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.
The main innovations in the paper are that the result is shown to hold for a wide class of partially
ordered spaces, and that best response sets only need to be join-closed (meaning that the join of
two best responses is again a best response).
Myerson and Reny [15] develop the concept of sequential equilibrium for a very general class of
multistage games with incomplete information. They prove existence of sequential equilibrium in
terms of induced finitely additive conditional probability distributions.
Fudenberg and Tirole [8] define perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for finite
Bayesian multi-period games, and show that these notions coincide when each player only has two
types.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss some preliminary notions in Section 2 and
present the model of Bayesian games in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we define the concept of
perfect BNE and analyze its properties. In Section 5, we apply our results to the above mentioned
auction. The paper ends with an extensive appendix, which contains the proofs of several technical
results that we use in earlier parts of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
A semi-ring S is a collection of subsets of a set X satisfying
1. ∅ ∈ S,
2. If E,F ∈ S then E ∩ F ∈ S,
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3. If E,F ∈ S then there exists a countable collection (Gi)i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets in S such
that E \ F =
⋃
i∈I
Gi.
A measure on a semi-ring S is a function µ : S → [0,∞) such that
1. µ(∅) = 0,
2. (σ-additivity) For every countable collection (Ai)i∈I of pairwise disjoint sets in S with
⋃
i∈I
Ai ∈
S we have
µ(
⋃
i∈I
Ai) =
∑
i∈I
µ(Ai).
A σ-field Σ is a collection of subsets of a set X satisfying
1. X ∈ Σ,
2. If E ∈ Σ then X \ E ∈ Σ,
3. If (Ei)i∈I is a countable collection of sets in Σ then
⋃
i∈I Ei ∈ Σ.
The pair (X,Σ) is called a measurable space.
A metric on a nonempty set X is a function d : X ×X → [0,∞) such that for all x, y, z ∈ X we
have
1. d(x, y) = 0⇔ x = y (identity of indiscernibles)
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry)
3. d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality).
The ordered pair (X, d) is called a metric space. For X ⊆ R we always consider the standard
Euclidean metric given by d(x, y) = |x − y|. The distance d(x,B) between a point x ∈ X and a
nonempty set B ⊆ X is defined as
d(x,B) = inf{d(x, y) | y ∈ B},
and if B = ∅, then d(x,B) =∞. The ε-neighborhood of B is denoted by Bε = {x ∈ X| d(x,B) <
ε}. A set U ⊆ X is called open if for every x ∈ U there is an ε > 0 such that
{y ∈ X | d(x, y) < ε} ⊆ U.
A set F ⊆ X is called closed if its complement X \F is open, and a set C ⊆ X is called compact if,
for every collection {Uα | α ∈ A} of open sets such that C ⊆ ∪α∈AUα, it holds that A has a finite
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subset A′ such that C ⊆ ∪α∈A′Uα. Every compact set in a metric space is closed as well. The
topology on X induced by metric d is the collection of all open sets, and the Borel σ-field Σ on X
is the smallest σ-field that contains all open sets. A measure on (X,Σ) is a function µ : Σ→ [0,∞)
such that µ(∅) = 0 and µ is σ-additive. A measure µ is called a probability measure if µ(X) = 1.
For a metric space (X, d), the set of probability measures on the Borel σ-field on X is denoted by
∆(X). A probability measure µ ∈ ∆(X) is completely mixed if µ(U) > 0 for every nonempty open
subset U of X. The weak (Prokhorov) metric ρw on ∆(X) is defined for every µ, ν ∈ ∆(X) by
ρw(µ, ν) = inf{ε > 0 | ∀B ∈ Σ : µ(B) ≤ ν(Bε) + ε and ν(B) ≤ µ(Bε) + ε}.
Let µn ∈ ∆(X) for every n ∈ N and let µ ∈ ∆(X). It is known that if the sequence µn converges
to µ with respect to ρw, then
∫
X
f(x)µn(dx) converges to
∫
X
f(x)µ(dx) for every bounded and
continuous function f : X → R. Conversely, if X is separable and ∫
X
f(x)µn(dx) converges to∫
X
f(x)µ(dx) for every bounded and Lipschitz function f : X → R, then µn converges to µ with
respect to ρw. Further, if X is compact, then so is ∆(X) with respect to ρw (cf. Prokhorov [18]
and Parthasarathy [17]).
Let (X1,Σ1), (X2,Σ2), . . . , (Xn,Σn) be measurable spaces. The product σ-field ⊗ni=1Σi on ×ni=1Xi
is defined to be the smallest σ-field that contains all the sets in ×ni=1Σi. Let µi be a measure on
(Xi,Σi), for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and µ be a measure on the semi-ring ×ni=1Σi defined by
µ(A1 × . . .×An) =
n∏
i=1
µi(Ai),
for every Ai ∈ Σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The product measure µ∗ is the extension of the measure µ to the
measurable space (×ni=1Xi,⊗ni=1Σi) via the formula
µ∗(E) = inf
{ ∞∑
k=1
µ(×ni=1Aki ) | E ⊆
∞⋃
k=1
(×ni=1Aki ), Aki ∈ Σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ∀k ∈ N
}
. (1)
According to Carathe´odory’s theorem, this extension is unique.
Let (X,Σ1), (Y,Σ2) be two measurable spaces. A function f : X −→ Y is called measurable if
f−1(B) ∈ Σ1 for every B ∈ Σ2.
3 Bayesian Games
Definition 1 A Bayesian game is a tuple Γ = (N, (Ti, dTi)i∈N , (Ai, dAi)i∈N , (µi)i∈N , (Πi)i∈N )
where:
1. N = {1, 2, .., n} is the set of players.
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2. Ti is a nonempty set of player i’s possible types with metric dTi . Let Ti denote the induced
Borel σ-field on Ti, T = ×ni=1Ti, and T = ⊗ni=1Ti.
3. Ai is a nonempty set of player i’s actions with metric dAi . Let Ai denote the induced Borel
σ-field on Ai, A = ×ni=1Ai, and A = ⊗ni=1Ai.
4. µi is a probability measure on (Ti, Ti) for player i. Let µ = ×ni=1µi be the product measure
on (T, T ).
5. Πi : T ×A→ R is player i’s payoff function, bounded and measurable with respect to T ⊗A.
Let Π = (Πi)
n
i=1.
The Bayesian game Γ is played as follows: First, nature draws a type ti ∈ Ti for each player i
according to the probability measure µi. Each player i learns his own type ti, but not the types of
the other players. Then, each player i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai, simultaneously and independently.
Finally, depending on the types t = (t1, . . . , tn) and the chosen actions a = (a1, . . . , an), each player
i receives the payoff Πi(t, a).
Now, we discuss different classes of strategies for the players. We start with the simplest ones.
Definition 2 A pure strategy for player i is a measurable function pi : Ti → Ai.
Thus, a pure strategy prescribes one specific action depending on the player’s type. Now we move
on to the strategies which use some randomization for the choice of an action. In the finite version
of the model, i.e., when Ti and Ai are finite, a mixed strategy is a probability measure on the
set of pure strategies, whereas a behavior strategy prescribes, for each possible type, a probability
measure on the set of available actions. Aumann [2] observed however that, for our infinite model,
the above view of a mixed strategy leads to measure theoretic problems and does not provide an
acceptable definition. Instead, a mixed strategy should be modeled by a random variable with
values in the set of pure strategies, whose domain is a probability measure space that is used as
the randomization device. This is the underlying idea of the definition of a mixed strategy for
player i as a measurable function αi : Ti × [0, 1]→ Ai, where the uniform distribution is imposed
on [0, 1]. The interpretation of a mixed strategy αi is that, after observing his own type ti and
drawing a randomization-variable si from [0, 1] according to uniform distribution, player i plays
αi(ti, si). Note that, for every si ∈ [0, 1], the section function αi(·, si) : Ti → Ai is a pure strategy.
Behavior strategies are defined with similar considerations:
Definition 3 (Milgrom and Weber) A behavior strategy for player i is a function βi : Ti ×Ai →
[0, 1] such that
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1. the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a probability measure for every ti ∈ Ti,
2. the section function βi(·, B) : Ti → [0, 1] is measurable for every B ∈ Ai.
A behavior strategy βi prescribes, depending on player i’s type ti, to choose an action accord-
ing to the probability measure βi(ti, ·). The second condition in the definition is included so
that the ex-ante probability that player i’s action falls into a set B ∈ Ai exists and is equal to∫
Ti
βi(ti, B) µi(dti). We will usually define a behavior strategy by specifying the section function
βi(ti, ·) for every type ti ∈ Ti. Behavior strategies are well suited for our purpose to define perfect
equilibrium. Indeed, the probability measures βi(ti, ·) are sufficient to describe player i’s behavior.
Moreover, as Aumann [2] showed, there is a many-to-one mapping from mixed to behavior strate-
gies that preserves the players’ expected payoffs, so mixed strategies would have no significant
added value. For these reasons, we build our definitions on behavior strategies. From now on, by
a strategy we will always mean a behavior strategy, unless mentioned otherwise.
Definition 4 A strategy βi for player i is called deterministic if, for every type ti ∈ Ti, there is an
action ai,ti ∈ Ai such that βi(ti, ·) is the Dirac measure on ai,ti . A strategy βi is called completely
mixed if the section function βi(ti, ·) : Ai → [0, 1] is a completely mixed probability measure for
every ti ∈ Ti. The vector β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn), where βi is a strategy of player i, is called a strategy
profile.
Each pure strategy pi naturally induces a deterministic strategy βi, for which βi(ti, ·) is the Dirac
measure on pi(ti) for every type ti ∈ Ti.
For every strategy profile β and every player i ∈ N , we write β−i = (βj)j∈N\{i} to denote the
profile consisting of strategies of the players in N \ {i}. Further, we use Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) to denote
player i’s expected payoff, given his type ti and his strategy βi, against a strategy profile τ−i.
Thus,
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi(t, a) βi(ti, dai) τ−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
In the expected payoff above, by integrals with respect to τ−i(t−i, da−i) and µ−i(dt−i) we mean
the iterated integrals with respect to τj(tj , daj) and µj(dtj) for all j = i. Fubini’s Theorem and
Theorem 27 in the appendix guarantee the existence of the iterated integrals in the expression
above, and also that the order of integration with respect to βi(ti, dai) and τj(tj , daj), j = i, is
not relevant. In the special case where player i uses a deterministic strategy with corresponding
pure strategy pi, player i’s expected payoff is denoted simply by Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi), and it is equal to
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi) =
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
Πi (t, (pi(ti), a−i)) τ−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
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Since, in the expected payoffs Eτ−i(Πi | ti, βi) and Eτ−i(Πi | ti, pi), it is irrelevant how player i
chooses his actions for types other than ti, we can naturally define Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) and Eτ−i(Πi |
ti, ai) for every probability measure σi on (Ai,Ai) and respectively for every action ai ∈ Ai.
A probability measure σi on (Ai,Ai) is called a best response of player i for type ti ∈ Ti against
a strategy profile τ−i, if for every probability measure σ′i on (Ai,Ai) we have
Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σi) ≥ Eτ−i(Πi | ti, σ′i).
The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(ti, τ−i). For a strategy profile τ , we will also use
the notation BRi(ti, τ) instead of BRi(ti, τ−i).
A strategy βi is called a best response of player i against a strategy profile τ−i, if βi(ti, ·) ∈
BRi(ti, τ−i) for every ti ∈ Ti. The set of such best responses is denoted by BRi(τ−i). For a
strategy profile τ , we will also use the notation BRi(τ) instead of BRi(τ−i). Note that all these
best response sets can be empty, which is illustrated by the following simple example.
Example 5 Consider the following Bayesian game with only one player: T1 = {t1}, A1 = [0, 1],
Π1(t1, x) = x for every x ∈ [0, 1), and Π1(t1, 1) = 0. In this game, the set of the best responses
(that is, optimal strategies) of player 1 is empty. ♦
Now we define a central solution concept of Bayesian games, namely the concept of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 6 A strategy profile β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE),
if βi is a best response of player i against β, for every player i.
There are Bayesian games which admit no BNE at all, for instance the game in Example 5. In
many Bayesian games of economic interest, however, there exist multiple BNEs, and some of them
are arguably more intuitive than others. As mentioned before, our goal is to develop the definition
of perfection for BNEs, which can be a useful tool in such games to distinguish the more intuitive
BNEs.
4 Behavioral Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In this section we propose a number of possible definitions of perfect BNE for Bayesian games.
We introduce three main definitions. In each of them, a different notion of convergence is used on
the set of strategies. At the end of the section, we draw some conclusions in the context of finite
games, i.e. when there are only finitely many types and actions.
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4.1 Uniform-Perfect BNE
Definition 7 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called uniform-perfect, if there exists a sequence
of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following properties
for every player i:
(1) lim
k→∞
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called a uniform-perfect BNE if β is a BNE and uniform-perfect.
Note that conditions (1) and (2) in the above definition require a uniform convergence of the corre-
sponding distances over the set of possible types. In the special case when the game has complete
information, i.e. each Ti is a singleton, our definition coincides with Simon and Stinchcombe’s
weak perfect equilibrium in [23].
A uniform-perfect strategy profile, and therefore a uniform-perfect BNE, does not always exist,
which is for instance the case in Example 5, because the best response set in this game is always
empty. Furthermore, even if a uniform-perfect strategy profile exists, it is not necessarily a BNE,
which is illustrated by the following example.
Example 8 Consider the following Bayesian game with only one player: T1 = {t1}, A1 = [0, 1],
Π1(t1, x) = 1 for every x ∈ [0, 1), and Π1(t1, 1) = 0. Define strategies β1 and βk1 , for every k ∈ N,
as follows: β1(t1, ·) = δ1(·) and βk1 (t1, ·) = (1 − 1k )δ1− 1k (·) +
1
kσ(·), for every k ∈ N, where δx
is the Dirac measure on action x and σ is the uniform distribution on the Borel sets of [0, 1].
Note that the set of the pure best responses (that is, optimal strategies) of player 1 consists of
all actions in [0, 1). So, the strategy β1 and the sequence of completely mixed strategies (β
k
1 )
∞
k=1
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 7. Therefore, β1 is a uniform-perfect strategy profile,
but it is clearly not a BNE. ♦
A uniform-perfect strategy profile may fail to exist, even if the type and action spaces are compact
and the payoff functions are continuous, as is shown in Example 11. Nevertheless, it follows from
Theorem 10 under fairly weak conditions that every uniform-perfect strategy profile is a BNE.
4.2 Pointwise-Perfect BNE
Definition 9 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called pointwise-perfect, if there exists a se-
quence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following
properties for every player i and each type ti ∈ Ti:
(1) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
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(2) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called a pointwise-perfect BNE if β is a BNE and pointwise-perfect.
Note that conditions (1) and (2) in the above definition require pointwise convergence of the
corresponding distances over the set of possible types.
A pointwise-perfect strategy profile, and therefore a pointwise-perfect BNE, does not always exist,
which is for instance the case in Example 5, because the best response set in this game is always
empty. Furthermore, it follows from Example 8 that a pointwise-perfect strategy profile is not
necessarily a BNE.
We do not know if a pointwise-perfect strategy profile always exists under the condition that the
type and action spaces are compact and the payoff functions are continuous. Nevertheless, we have
the following result.
Theorem 10 In a Bayesian game where the action spaces are separable and Πi(t, ·) is continuous
on A for every player i and every t ∈ T , every pointwise-perfect strategy profile is a BNE.
Proof. Suppose that β = (β1, . . . , βn) is a pointwise-perfect strategy profile in such a Bayesian
game. For β, take a sequence of strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 as in Definition 9. Fix a player i and a
type ti ∈ Ti. Due to condition (2) in Definition 9, there exists a Ki(ti) ∈ N such that BRi(ti, βk)
is nonempty for every k ≥ Ki(ti). Therefore, by condition (2) once more, there exists a sequence
(σki,ti)
∞
k=1 of probability measures on (Ai,Ai) such that σki,ti ∈ BRi(ti, βk) for every k ≥ Ki(ti)
and ρw(βki (ti, ·), σki,ti)→ 0 as k →∞. By condition (1) and by the triangle inequality for ρw, this
implies that ρw(βi(ti, ·), σki,ti)→ 0 as k →∞.
For every k ≥ Ki(ti) and every probability measure σ′ on (Ai,Ai), we have due to σki,ti ∈
BRi(ti, β
k) that Eβk−i(Πi | ti, σki ) ≥ Eβk−i(Πi | ti, σ′), which means that∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σki,ti(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i) (2)
≥
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ′(dai) βk−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i).
According to Theorem 3.2 in [5], in a separable product space the weak convergence of the product
measure is equivalent to the weak convergence of the marginal measures. Hence, because A is
separable, the weak convergence of σki,ti to βi(ti, ·) and of βkj (tj , ·) to βj(tj , ·) for every player j = i
and every type tj ∈ Tj implies that, for any t−i ∈ T−i, the product measure σki,ti ×
(×j =iβkj (tj , ·))
on (A,A) weakly converges to the product measure βi(ti, ·) × (×j =iβj(tj , ·)). Since the payoff
function Πi((ti, t−i), ·) is continuous on A for every t−i ∈ T−i, by Fubini’s theorem we have for
every t−i ∈ T−i
lim
k→∞
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σki,ti(dai) β
k
−i(t−i, da−i)
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=
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i),
and similarly
lim
k→∞
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ′(dai) βk−i(t−i, da−i)
=
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi ((ti, t−i), a) σ′(dai) β−i(t−i, da−i).
Thus, if we take the limit in inequality (2) when k → ∞, by the dominated convergence theorem
we obtain∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi (t, a) βi(ti, dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i)
≥
∫
T−i
∫
A−i
∫
Ai
Πi (t, a) σ
′(dai) β−i(t−i, da−i) µ−i(dt−i),
which means Eβ−i(Πi | ti, βi(ti, ·)) ≥ Eβ−i(Πi | ti, σ′). Hence, βi(ti, ·) ∈ BRi(ti, β). Since player i
and type ti were chosen arbitrary, the strategy profile β is a BNE as claimed.
It is clear that every uniform-perfect BNE is also pointwise-perfect. Now, we provide a game which
demonstrates that the converse is not always true. This game has a pointwise-perfect BNE, but it
has no uniform-perfect BNE, in fact not even a uniform-perfect strategy profile, although the type
and action spaces are compact and the payoff functions are continuous.
Example 11 Consider the following Bayesian game with two players: Player 1 has only one
possible type, T1 = {t1}, whereas player 2’s type space is T2 = {t12, t22, . . . , t∞2 } in which t∞2 is
the limit point of the sequence (tm2 )
∞
m=1. The probability measure µ2 on (T2, T2) is arbitrary. The
action spaces are A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,R}. The payoff matrix when player 1 is the row-player
and is given type t1, and player 2 is the column-player and is given type t
m
2 , for every m ∈ N, is
the following:
(t1, t
m
2 ) L R
U 0,− 1m 0, 0
D 1, 1m2 1, 0
and the payoff matrix when player 1 is given type t1 and player 2 is given type t
∞
2 is:
(t1, t
∞
2 ) L R
U 0, 0 0, 0
D 1, 0 1, 0
Observe that the type and action spaces in this game are compact, and the payoff functions are
continuous.
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Define p1(t1) = D and p2(t
m
2 ) = L, for every m ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Let β1 and β2 be the deterministic
strategies corresponding to p1 and p2 respectively. We claim that (β1, β2) is a pointwise-perfect
BNE, but the game has no uniform-perfect strategy profile, so no uniform-perfect BNE either.
The proof that (β1, β2) is a pointwise-perfect BNE: Clearly, (β1, β2) is a BNE, so it remains
to prove that (β1, β2) is pointwise-perfect. For every k ∈ N, define two completely mixed strategies
βk1 and β
k
2 by letting β
k
1 (t1, ·) = (1− 1k )δD(·)+ 1k δU (·) and βk2 (tm2 , ·) = (1− 1k )δL(·)+ 1k δR(·) for every
m ∈ N ∪ {∞}, where δx denotes the Dirac measure on x. The sequence (βk)∞k=1 = (βk1 , βk2 )∞k=1
clearly satisfies condition (1) of Definition 9, and it also satisfies condition (2) for player 1 and
condition (2) for type t∞2 of player 2. It remains to verify condition (2) for an arbitrary type t
m
2
for player 2 where m ∈ N. Take such a type tm2 . We have
Eβk1 (Π2 | t
m
2 , L) = (1− 1k ) · 1m2 + 1k · (− 1m ),
which is strictly positive for large k. Hence, BR2(t
m
2 , β
k) = {δL} for large k, which implies that
condition (2) of Definition 9 holds for type tm2 . Thus, (β1, β2) is pointwise-perfect indeed.
The proof that this game has no uniform-perfect strategy profile: Suppose by way of
contradiction that τ = (τ1, τ2) is a uniform-perfect strategy profile. Then, there is a sequence of
completely mixed strategy profiles (τk)∞k=1 = (τ
k
1 , τ
k
2 )
∞
k=1 that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of
Definition 7 for τ . First notice that, by the triangle inequality for ρw, we have
sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τ2(t2, ·), BR2(t2, τk)) ≤ sup
t2∈T2
[
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), τ2(t2, ·)) + ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), BR2(t2, τk))
]
≤ sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), τ2(t2, ·)) + sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τk2 (t2, ·), BR2(t2, τk)),
and therefore conditions (1) and (2) imply
lim
k→∞
sup
t2∈T2
ρw(τ2(t2, ·), BR2(t2, τk)) = 0. (3)
For every k ∈ N, the probability measure τk1 (t1, ·) can be written in the form τk1 (t1, ·) = (1 −
εk)δU (·) + εkδD(·) with some εk ∈ (0, 1). Due to condition (2) for player 1, we must have that
εk → 1 as k →∞.
For every k ∈ N and every type tm2 for player 2, where m ∈ N, we have
Eτk1 (Π2 | t
m
2 , L) = εk · 1m2 + (1− εk) · (− 1m ),
whereas Eτk1 (Π2 | tm2 , R) = 0. It has two consequences. First, for every tm2 , where m ∈ N, we have
BR2(t
m
2 , τ
k) = {δL} for large k, which in view of (3) yields τ2(tm2 , ·) = δL(·) for every tm2 , where
m ∈ N. Second, for every k ∈ N, we have BR2(tm2 , τk) = {δR} for large m. In conclusion, for every
k ∈ N, if m is large, then τ2(tm2 , ·) = δL(·) and BR2(tm2 , τk) = {δR}. This is in contradiction with
(3), so τ is not a uniform-perfect strategy profile. ♦
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4.3 a.e.-Pointwise-Perfect BNE
Definition 12 A strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn) is called a.e.-pointwise-perfect (where a.e. stands
for almost everywhere), if for every player i there exists a set Si ∈ Ti with µi(Si) = 0 and a sequence
of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1 with the following properties
for every player i and every type ti ∈ Ti \ Si:
(1) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0,
(2) lim
k→∞
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)) = 0.
A strategy profile β is called an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE if β is a BNE and a.e.-pointwise-perfect.
An a.e.-pointwise-perfect strategy profile, and therefore an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE, does not
always exist, which is for instance the case in Example 5, because the best response set in this game
is always empty. Furthermore, it follows from Example 8 that an a.e.-pointwise-perfect strategy
profile is not necessarily a BNE.
It is clear that every pointwise-perfect BNE is also a.e.-pointwise-perfect. The following example
proves that the converse is not always true.
Example 13 Consider the following Bayesian game with two players: The type spaces are T1 =
{t1} and T2 = {t12, t22}, and µ2 is given by µ2(t12) = 1 and µ2(t22) = 0. The action spaces are
A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,R}. The payoff matrix is the following if player 1 is given type t1
whereas player 2 is given type tm2 for m = 1, 2:
(t1, t
m
2 ) L R
U 0, 1 0, 0
D 1, 0 1, 0
Define p1(t1) = D, p2(t
1
2) = L and p2(t
2
2) = R. Let β1 and β2 be the deterministic strategies
corresponding to p1 and p2 respectively. It is clear that (β1, β2) is an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE,
by choosing S1 = ∅ and S2 = {t22} in Definition 12. Yet, (β1, β2) is not pointwise-perfect, because
player 2 chooses R with probability 1 if he receives type t22.
We remark that a similar example can be made where T2 = [0, 1], µ2 is the uniform distribution
on T2, and where the strategy profile is not pointwise-perfect only due to a single type, say type
t2 = 1. ♦
The following theorem presents conditions under which there is a strong connection between a.e.-
pointwise and pointwise-perfection.
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Proposition 14 Let β be an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE in a Bayesian game with compact action
spaces. Let Si, for every player i, and (β
k)∞k=1 be as in Definition 12 for β. Suppose that Si is
countable for every player i and BRi(ti, β
k) is nonempty for every player i, every type ti ∈ Si and
every k ∈ N. Then, there is a pointwise-perfect BNE βˆ such that βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·) holds for every
player i and every type ti ∈ Ti \ Si.
Proof. For such an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE β, we can construct a desired pointwise-perfect
BNE βˆ as follows. For every player i ∈ N , every type ti ∈ Si, and every k ∈ N, by assumption of
the proposition, we can choose a probability measure σki,ti ∈ BRi(ti, βk). Now, define a profile of
completely mixed strategies βˆk, for every k ∈ N, by letting
βˆki (ti, ·) =
{
βki (ti, ·) if ti ∈ Ti \ Si
(1− 1k )σki,ti(·) + 1kβki (ti, ·) if ti ∈ Si
for every player i ∈ N and type ti ∈ Ti.
In the remaining part of the proof, we use several fairly known results from analysis, which can
all be found in [1]. By assumption, Ai is compact in the topology induced by the metric dAi , so
the set ∆(Ai) of probability measures on (Ai,Ai) is also compact with respect to the topology
induced by the weak metric. Consequently, the product space ×i∈N ×ti∈Si ∆(Ai) is compact in
the product topology by Tychonoff’s theorem, and because Si is countable, this topology is even
metrizable. Therefore, this topological space is sequentially compact, which assures the existence
of a subsequence (kr)
∞
r=1 so that σ
kr
i,ti
converges to some σi,ti ∈ ∆(Ai), for every player i ∈ N and
every ti ∈ Ti, with respect to the weak metric. So, define a strategy for every player i ∈ N by
βˆi(ti, ·) =
{
βi(ti, ·) if ti ∈ Ti \ Si
σi,ti(·) if ti ∈ Si
for every type ti ∈ Ti. Notice that the profile βˆ = (βˆi)i∈N is a pointwise-perfect equilibrium.
Indeed, for the sequence βˆkr , condition (1) of Definition 9 is obviously satisfied, and so is condition
(2) because BRi(ti, βˆ
kr ) = BRi(ti, β
kr ) holds due to µj(Sj) = 0 for all players j.
The next example shows that the condition that Si is countable is crucial in Proposition 14 if there
are at least three players. We do not know if this condition is also crucial for games with only two
players.
Example 15 Consider the following Bayesian game with three players. The type spaces are
T1 = {0, 1}N, T2 = {t2} and T3 = {t3}. The metric dT1 on T1 is defined as follows: for t1, t′1 ∈ T1,
if t1 = t
′
1 then let dT1(t1, t
′
1) = 0, otherwise if m is the first coordinate in which t1 and t
′
1 differ,
then let dT1(t1, t
′
1) = 2
−m. Notice that dT1 induces the product topology on T1. Further, let
µ1 = δ(1,1,...), i.e. the Dirac measure on the type (1, 1, . . .). The action spaces are A1 = {U,D},
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A2 = {a1, a2, . . . , a∞}, and A3 = {b1, b2, . . . , b∞}, in which am = bm = 1− 1m for every m ∈ N and
a∞ = b∞ = 1. For every type t1 ∈ {0, 1}N, let fm(t1) be the m-th coordinate of the sequence t1.
When player 1 is given type t1 ∈ {0, 1}N \ {1, 1, . . .}, the payoff of player 1 is independent of the
action chosen by player 3, and it is given by
t1 ∈ {0, 1}N \ {(1, 1, . . .)} am a∞
U fm(t1) 0
D 1−fm(t1) 0
whereas if player 1 is given type t1 = (1, 1, . . .):
t1 = (1, 1, . . .) am a∞
U 0 0
D 0 0
The payoffs of players 2 and 3 are independent of the action chosen by player 1, and are given by:
b1 b2 b3 b4 . . . b∞
a1 0,0 0,
1
2 0,
1
3 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a2
1
2 ,0 0,0 0,
1
3 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a3
1
3 ,0
1
3 ,0 0,0 0,
1
4 . . . 0,0
a4
1
4 ,0
1
4 ,0
1
4 ,0 0,0 . . . 0,0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
a∞ 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 . . . 0,0
In general, if player 2 chooses action am and player 3 chooses action b, with m,  ∈ N, then player
2’s payoff is 1m if m > , and 0 otherwise, and player 3’s payoff is
1
 if  > m, and 0 otherwise.
We remark that the type and action spaces in this game are all compact. Since the payoff functions
of players 2 and 3 are continuous, and player 1 has only finitely many actions, the best reply set
BRi(ti, β) is nonempty for every player i, every ti ∈ Ti and every strategy profile β. We claim:
(1) there exists an a.e.-pointwise-perfect equilibrium in this game, but (2) this game admits no
pointwise-perfect strategy profile.
An a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE: First we construct an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE. Define
p1(t1) = U for every t1 ∈ T1, p2(t2) = a∞ and p3(t3) = b∞. Let β˜i be the deterministic strategy for
each player i corresponding to pi. Now we prove that β˜ = (β˜1, β˜2, β˜3) is an a.e.-pointwise-perfect
BNE. Let S1 = T1 \ {(1, 1, . . .)} and S2 = S3 = ∅. Further, take arbitrary completely mixed
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probability measures σ2 and σ3 on (A2,A2) and (A3,A3), respectively. For every k ∈ N, define
the completely mixed strategies
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1− 1k ) · δU (·) + 1k · δD(·) for every t1 ∈ T1
βk2 (t2, ·) = (1− 1k2 ) · δak(·) + 1k2 · σ2(·)
βk3 (t3, ·) = (1− 1k2 ) · δbk(·) + 1k2 · σ3(·).
If player 2 plays actions ak+1 against β
k
3 (t3, ·), then he receives at least (1 − 1k2 ) 1k+1 , whereas he
receives at most 1k+2 by playing an action a with  > k + 1 and receives at most
1
2k2 by playing
an action a with  < k+1. Thus, for every k ≥ 3, action ak+1 is player 2’s (unique) best response
to βk3 (t3, ·), and for similar reasons, action bk+1 is player 3’s (unique) best response to βk2 (t2, ·).
Based on this observation, one can check easily that S1, S2, S3 and the sequence β
k = (βk1 , β
k
2 , β
k
3 )
satisfy the conditions of Definition 12 for β˜. Thus, β˜ is an a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE indeed.
No pointwise-perfect strategy profile: Now we claim that there is no pointwise-perfect strat-
egy profile in this game. (Note that S1 above is uncountable, so Proposition 14 does not apply.)
Suppose by way of contradiction that β = (β1, β2, β3) is a pointwise-perfect strategy profile, with
some sequence (βk)∞k=1 as required in Definition 9.
First we prove that β2(t2, ·) and β3(t3, ·) put probability 1 on action a∞ and b∞, respectively,
i.e. β2(t2, {a∞}) = β3(t3, {b∞}) = 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that β2(t2, {a∞}) < 1;
the proof is similar if β3(t3, {b∞}) < 1. Let m∗ = min{m ∈ N | β2(t2, {am}) > 0}. Since
player 3 can get a positive payoff against β2(t2, ·), and β3(t3, ·) is a best response to β2(t2, ·), we
must have β3(t3, {b∞}) = 0. So, also player 2 can get a positive payoff against β3(t3, ·). Let
∗ = min{ ∈ N|β3(t3, {b}) > 0}. Now, if m∗ ≤ ∗, then action am∗ gives payoff zero to player 2,
which is a contradiction as β2(t2, {am∗}) > 0. Similarly, if ∗ ≤ m∗, then action b∗ gives payoff
zero to player 3, which is a contradiction as β3(t3, {b∗}) > 0. So, β2(t2, {a∞}) = β3(t3, {b∞}) = 1
must hold indeed.
For every k ∈ N, let σk be the probability measure on (A2,A2) defined by σk(a∞) = 0 and
σk(am) =
βk2 (t2, {am})
1− βk2 (t2, {a∞})
for every m ∈ N. So, σk(am) equals the probability that action am is chosen with respect to
βk2 (t2, ·) conditioned on the event that a∞ is not chosen. We now claim that for every m ∈ N
lim
k→∞
σk({a1, . . . , am}) = 0. (4)
Suppose by way of contradiction that for some m ∈ N there exists a Z > 0 and a subsequence
(kr)
∞
r=1 such that σ
kr ({a1, . . . , am}) ≥ Z for every r ∈ N. Notice that, for every r ∈ N, action bm+1
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gives in expectation at least Zm+1 to player 3 against σ
kr , hence at least (1− βkr2 (t2, {a∞})) · Zm+1
against βkr . Now consider any action bw with w >
m+1
Z . Since player 3’s highest payoff for
action bw is
1
w , action bw gives player 3 in expectation strictly less than
Z
m+1 against σ
kr , hence
strictly less than (1− βkr2 (t2, {a∞})) · Zm+1 against βkr . Therefore, player 3’s best responses are in
{b1, . . . , bm+1Z } against β
kr for any r ∈ N. Since player 3’s best responses along this subsequence
are not approaching b∞ with respect to the weak metric, the sequence βk cannot satisfy both
conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 9. Thus, (4) holds as claimed.
Let k1 = 1 and m1 ∈ N be such that σk1({a1, . . . , am1}) > 12 . Then, by (4), there exists a k2 > k1
and an m2 > m1 such that σ
k2({am1+1, . . . , am2}) > 12 . By repeating this argument, we obtain in
N two strictly increasing sequences (mr)∞r=1 and (kr)∞r=1 such that for every r ∈ N
σkr ({am |m ∈Wr}) > 1
2
, (5)
where Wr = {mr−1+1, . . . ,mr} and m0 = 0. Note that the sets Wr, r ∈ N, form a partition of N.
Now let t1 be the type in {0, 1}N such that fm(t1) = 1 if m ∈Wr for an odd r ∈ N and fm(t1) = 0
if m ∈ Wr for an even r ∈ N. Take an arbitrary odd r ∈ N. Then, fm(t1) = 1 for any m ∈ Wr,
and since σkr ({am |m ∈ Wr}) > 12 due to (5), player 1’s unique best response to βkr is action U .
Similarly, when r ∈ N is even, player 1’s unique best response to βkr is action D. So, the sequence
βk cannot satisfy both conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 9 for type t1, which is a contradiction.
Consequently, there is no pointwise-perfect strategy profile in this game. ♦
The following corollary follows easily from Proposition 14.
Corollary 16 Consider a Bayesian game in which the type spaces are countable, the action spaces
are compact, and the payoff functions are continuous. Then, for every a.e.-pointwise-perfect BNE
β, there exists a pointwise-perfect BNE βˆ such that, for every player i, we have βˆi(ti, ·) = βi(ti, ·)
for µi-a.e. type ti ∈ Ti.
Now, we examine Bayesian games which satisfy the following two measurability conditions:
• Condition M1: For any player i and any strategies β1i , β2i of player i, the map
ti → ρw(β1i (ti, ·), β2i (ti, ·))
is measurable.
• Condition M2: For any player i, any strategy βi of player i, and any strategy profile τ , the
map
ti → ρw(βi(ti, ·), BRi(ti, τ))
is measurable.
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Condition M1 is mild, because if the action spaces are σ-compact, then M1 is always satisfied (cf.
Lemma 29). It is not clear if mild conditions are also sufficient to guarantee M2.
Now, we present a number of conditions that are all equivalent to a.e.-pointwise-perfection, under
the additional assumptions of M1 and M2.
Proposition 17 Consider a Bayesian game which satisfies conditions M1 and M2. Then, for
every strategy profile β = (β1, . . . , βn), equivalent are:
i. The strategy profile β is a.e.-pointwise-perfect.
ii. There exists a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1
such that for every player i and every ε > 0:
(ii.1) lim
k→∞
µi
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) ≥ ε
}
= 0,
(ii.2) lim
k→∞
µi
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)) ≥ ε
}
= 0.
iii. There exists a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , . . . , β
k
n)
∞
k=1
such that for every player i:
(iii.1) lim
k→∞
∫
Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) µi(dti) = 0,
(iii.2) lim
k→∞
∫
Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)) µi(dti) = 0.
The intuition behind conditions (ii) and (iii) is the following. For every player i and every k ∈ N,
define a function Xki : Ti → R by Xki (ti) = ρw
(
βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)
)
, and a function Y ki : Ti → R
by Y ki (ti) = ρ
w
(
βki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βk)
)
. Due to the assumptions M1 and M2, these functions are
measurable, and therefore they are random variables on the measurable space (Ti, Ti). Conditions
(ii.1) and (ii.2) respectively require that both sequences Xki and Y
k
i converge in probability to zero
(i.e. to the random variable that is zero everywhere). So, the probability that Xki and Y
k
i are far
from zero becomes negligible for large k. Conditions (iii.1) and (iii.2) mean that both sequences Xki
and Y ki converge in expectation to zero, with respect to the distribution µi. This makes intuitive
sense because the type of player i is drawn from Ti according to µi.
Proof. The implication (i)→(ii) follows immediately from the fact that pointwise convergence
almost everywhere implies convergence in probability. The implication (ii)→(iii) is also valid,
because the sequences Xki and Y
k
i are uniformly bounded and hence if they converge in probability
to zero, then they also converge to zero in expectation. So as to prove the implication (iii)→(i),
we argue that both implications (iii)→(ii) and (ii)→(i) are valid. The implication (iii)→(ii) holds
because convergence in expectation implies convergence in probability. Finally, the implication
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(ii)→(i) follows from the fact that convergence in probability implies the existence of a subsequence
that pointwisely converges to the same limit almost everywhere. Hence, if the sequences Xki and
Y ki converge in probability to zero, then there are subsequences X
km
i and Y
km
i which satisfy the
conditions of Definition 12.
The equivalence of the conditions of Proposition 17 is remarkable in view of the fact that pointwise
convergence almost everywhere, convergence in probability and convergence in expectation are not
equivalent in general.
4.4 Perfection in Finite Bayesian Games
In this subsection, we discuss some direct consequences of our previous results on Bayesian games
in which there are only finitely many types and actions. First of all, it is clear that the uniform
and the pointwise approaches coincide. The a.e.-pointwise approach can however lead to different
results, but only in the - perhaps less interesting - case when certain types occur with probability
0.
Theorem 18 Every Bayesian game with finitely many types and actions admits a pointwise-perfect
(or equivalently, uniform-perfect) BNE.
Proof. We only provide a sketch of the proof. First, consider the corresponding game G′ with
ex-ante probabilities in which each player i has action set A′i = ×ti∈TiAi and wants to maximize
his ex-ante expected payoff, i.e. his expected payoff before he learns his own type. The game G′ is
a game with complete information and with finite action spaces, so it has a perfect equilibrium σ
in the classical sense with a corresponding sequence of completely mixed strategies (σk)∞k=1. Let
β be the (unique) strategy in the original game G such that, given any type ti ∈ Ti, the strategies
σ and β induce the same probability on every action ai ∈ Ai, i.e. β(ti, ai) = σ(A′i[ti, ai]), where
A′i[ti, ai] is the set of all members of A
′
i whose coordinate at position ti is exactly ai. Define β
k for
every k ∈ N in a similar way with regard to σk. It is not difficult to see that β is an a.e.-pointwise-
perfect BNE, with the sequence (βk)∞k=1 and with Si being for every player i the set of all types
ti ∈ Ti that occur with probability 0. The reason is that if a type ti ∈ Ti occurs with a positive
probability, then this type is also taken into account by the ex-ante approach. Now, Proposition
14 completes the proof.
5 A second-price auction with incomplete information
We examine perfect equilibrium in a second price auction with incomplete information, in which
bidders have no dominant strategies. In this auction we identify a symmetric BNE β, and argue that
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β is a natural candidate solution for the auction from a conceptual and normative perspective. The
BNE β separates the types, and it is differentiable–so that bids increase smoothly with type. We
show that β is unique in this respect, there is no other strategy pair that features these properties.
Moreover, as uncertainty vanishes, the BNE β converges to the classical truthful dominant strategy
equilibrium in the Vickrey auction.
We show that perfect equilibrium is a useful tool to select the BNE β in this auction. In particular,
we show that β is uniform-perfect. Next, we present a few classes of other BNEs for the auction.
These BNEs are arguably less intuitive in the sense that types (at least partially) pool their bids.
We show that perfection eliminates these equilibria, so that the BNE β is uniquely selected by
perfection from a large class of BNEs. Finally we argue that the usual standard selection criteria
sincere bidding and dominant strategy equilibrium, have no bite in this context, and do not single
out the BNE β. As the proofs in this section are technical in nature, we only discuss the main
results, and defer the formal proofs to the appendix.
Consider the following sealed-bid second price auction Γα for a single indivisible object, where
α is a parameter in (0, 1). There are two bidders, whose respective types t1 and t2 are drawn
independently from T1 = T2 = [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution. The valuations of the
bidders are symmetric and are given by v1(t1, t2) = 5+ t1 − αt2 and v2(t1, t2) = 5+ t2 − αt1. The
set of available bids is A1 = A2 = [5− α, 6]. The tie-breaking rule can be arbitrary, and plays no
role in our analysis.
5.1 A symmetric BNE
For each bidder i, define the pure strategy Bi(ti) = 5+(1−α)ti, and denote by βi the corresponding
deterministic strategy. In this subsection we argue that, from a conceptual and normative point
of view, the strategy pair β = (β1, β2) is a natural candidate solution for the auction.
Concretely, we have the following claims. The strategy pair β is a symmetric BNE, it separates
the types, and it is differentiable–so that bids increase smoothly with type. It is also unique in
this, there is no other strategy pair that features all these properties. Moreover, as uncertainty
vanishes, so α → 0, the BNE β converges to the classical truthful dominant strategy equilibrium
in the Vickrey auction.
We first observe that β is a BNE. The proof of this observation is deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 19 The symmetric deterministic strategy profile β = (β1, β2) is a BNE.
Next, we show that β is the unique BNE within the class of differentiable separating pure strategy
pairs. Let F be the class of deterministic strategies in which the corresponding pure strategies
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pi : Ti → Ai for bidders i = 1, 2 satisfy the following conditions:
(i) p1(0) = p2(0) and p1(1) = p2(1),
(ii) pi is differentiable and
d
dti
pi(ti) > 0 for every ti ∈ Ti.
Thus, F is the class of pure and differentiable strategies for which the bid is strictly increasing in
type. In particular, elements of F separate the types of a player in the sense that the type can be
inferred from the bid since no two types make the same bid 4. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 20 The BNE β is the only pure BNE in class F.
Thus, the BNE β is the unique differentiable separating BNE. Moreover, as we already noted, when
uncertainty vanishes (so, when α→ 0) β converges to the truthful dominant strategy equilibrium
in the Vickrey auction.
5.2 The selective power of perfect BNE
Thus, β is a natural candidate as a solution for the auction we study. We show that perfect BNE
does select the differentiable separating BNE β, from among many equilibria in the auction. We
first show that β is a perfect BNE.
Proposition 21 The BNE β is uniform-perfect.
We describe the idea of the proof. Let CM : [0, 1]→ [5− α, 6] be defined by CM (r) = 5+ (1− α)r
for all r ∈ [0, 1] and µ be the uniform distribution on [5− α, 6]. The first idea would be to look at
the sequences of completely mixed strategies βˆki given by βˆ
k
i (ti, ·) = (1− εk)δCM (ti)(·) + εkµ(·) for
both players i = 1, 2 and for every ti, where δ is the Dirac measure and εk is a sequence in (0, 1)
converging to zero. One can verify that the sequence βˆki satisfies condition (1) of Definition 7, and
limk→∞ ρw(βˆki (ti, ·), BRi(ti, βˆk)) = 0 for every ti ∈ (0, 1). However, the latter does not hold for ti =
0, 1. More precisely, one can easily check that BRi(0, βˆ
k) = {5− 12α} and BRi(1, βˆk) = {6− 12α},
for every k. However, by defining the completely mixed strategies in a more delicate way, we can
prove that (β1, β2) is uniform-perfect. We introduce two more curves CT , CL : [0, 1]→ [5−α, 6] by
CT (r) = 6− αr2, and CL(r) = 5− α+ α(1− r)2. These curves are depicted in the picture below.
4The first condition is mainly a normalization.
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CL
CT
CM
5
5 − α
6 − α
6
0 1
The curves CT and CL will be used to repair the above mentioned problem for types 0 and 1. For
every k ∈ N, let εk = 1k+3 and βk1 : T1 ×A1 → [0, 1] be the completely mixed strategy for bidder 1
which is given for every t1 ∈ T1 = [0, 1] by
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1− 2εk − ε2k) δCM (t1)(·) + εk δCT (t1)(·) + εk δCL(t1)(·) + ε2k µ(·).
The cumulative probability distribution with respect to βk1 (t1, ·) is shown on A1 = [5−α, 6] in the
picture below.
b1
1
5 − α CL(t1) CM (t1) CT (t1) 6
Similarly, define a completely mixed strategy βk2 for bidder 2. In the Appendix we will show that
the sequence of strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , β
k
2 )
∞
k=1 satisfies conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 7.
Hence, the BNE β is uniform-perfect.
Next, we present a few classes of other BNEs for the auction. They are arguably less intuitive in
the sense that types (at least partially) pool their bids. We show that perfection eliminates these
equilibria. We start with Wolf and Sheep BNEs.
Proposition 22 The deterministic strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2), given by σ1(t1, ·) = δ6(·) for every
t1 ∈ T1 and σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·) for every t2 ∈ T2, is a BNE. However, σ is not pointwise-perfect,
and hence not uniform-perfect either.
It is worthwhile to note that the BNE introduced in Proposition 22 is just one of the many other
BNEs of the same type. In all of this type of BNEs, the lowest bid of Wolf player is strictly larger
than the highest bid of Sheep player.
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 24
The following proposition considers a deterministic BNE in which the corresponding pure strategies,
as functions of the types, are not continuous. Also on this type of BNE we could construct many
variations.
Proposition 23 The deterministic strategy profile η = (η1, η2) is a BNE, where η1 and η2 corre-
spond to the pure strategies b1 and b2 given by
b1(t1) =
{
5 if t1 ∈ [0, x(α)]
6 if t1 ∈ (x(α), 1] and b2(t2) =
{
5− α if t2 ∈ [0, y(α)]
5.1 if t2 ∈ (y(α), 1] ,
with x(α) = 0.4+2α4−α2 and y(α) =
α(0.2+α)
4−α2 .
However, η is not pointwise-perfect, and hence not uniform-perfect either.
Thus, perfection selects the equilibrium β from among a large class of equilibria. Finally we argue
that other standard selection criteria such as sincere bidding and dominance do not have a bite
when uncertainty is present (that is, when α > 0). In particular, these selection criteria do not
single out the separating BNE β in this example.
Proposition 24 There does not exist a symmetric, deterministic, and strictly increasing BNE
in which bidders bid sincere given the opponent’s bid function. In particular, the BNE β is not
sincere, in the sense that for each bidder i, there are types ti for which Bi(ti) does not equal his
expected evaluation of the object given ti.
Proposition 25 Neither bidder has a dominant strategy in the auction Γα in the following sense:
neither bidder i has a strategy βi such that for every type ti, every strategy σi of bidder i and every
strategy β−i of bidder i’s opponents we have
Eβ−i(Πi | ti, βi) ≥ Eβ−i(Πi | ti, σi).
In fact in the Appendix we prove a somewhat stronger statement, namely that in the above
statement we could replace “every type ti” by “every type ti in a subset of types with a strictly
positive measure”.
Hence, the usual standard selection criteria sincere bidding and dominant strategy equilibrium,
have no bite in the context of Bayesian games, and do not single out the BNE β.
6 Appendix I: Semi-product measures
Definition 26 Let (X,Σ1) and (Y,Σ2) be two measurable spaces, µ be a measure on (X,Σ1) and
τ : X × Σ2 → [0,∞) be a bounded function with the following properties :
1. the section function τ(x, ·) : Σ2 → [0,∞) is a measure on (Y,Σ2) for every x ∈ X,
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2. the section function τ(·, B) : X → [0,∞) is a measurable function for every B ∈ Σ2.
Let λ be a measure on the semi-ring Σ1 × Σ2 defined by
λ(A×B) =
∫
A
τ(x,B) µ(dx),
for every A × B ∈ Σ1 × Σ2. The unique extension of the measure λ by the formula (1) to the
product σ-field Σ1 ⊗Σ2 is denoted by λ∗ and is called the semi-product measure corresponding to
τ and µ.
Note that λ is well-defined, because the section function τ(·, B) is bounded and measurable for
every B ∈ Σ2. The following theorem states the integral respect to λ∗ as iterated integrals respect
to τ and µ. Dudley states a sketch of the proof in [7].
Theorem 27 Let (X,Σ1) and (Y,Σ2) be two measurable spaces and let λ
∗ be the semi-product
measure corresponding to τ and µ. Then, for every function f : X×Y → R bounded and measurable
with respect to the σ-field Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 we have∫
X×Y
f dλ∗ =
∫
X
∫
Y
f τ(x, dy)µ(dx).
In particular, λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x,Ex)µ(dx) for every E ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 where Ex = {y ∈ Y | (x, y) ∈ E}.
Proof. Let E ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2. We first show that λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x,Ex)µ(dx). Let N be the collection
of all sets E ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 such that
(i). x → τ(x,Ex) is a measurable function, and
(ii). λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x,Ex)µ(dx).
We prove that N is a σ-field.
1. It is clear that X × Y ∈ N . Indeed, x → τ(x, Y ) is measurable according to condition (2) of
Definition 26, and λ∗(X × Y ) = λ(X × Y ) =
∫
X
τ(x, Y )µ(dx).
2. We show that if E ∈ N , then Ec ∈ N :
(i). Since x → τ(x,Ex) is measurable and τ(x, Y )− τ(x,Ex) = τ(x,Ecx), the map x → τ(x,Ecx) is
also measurable.
(ii). λ∗(Ec) = λ∗(X × Y )− λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x, Y ) µ(dx)−
∫
X
τ(x,Ex)µ(dx)
=
∫
X
(τ(x, Y )− τ(x,Ex))µ(dx)
=
∫
X
τ(x, Y \Ex)µ(dx)
=
∫
X
τ(x,Ecx)µ(dx).
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3. We show that if (Ei)∞i=1 is a countable collection of sets in N , then
∞⋃
i=1
Ei ∈ N :
Without loss of generality we assume that E1, E2, . . . are pairwise disjoint, because otherwise we
can consider the pairwise disjoint sets E1, E2\E1, E3\(E1 ∪ E2), . . ..
(i). Since x → τ(x,Eix) is measurable for every i ∈ N, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem
the map that assigns to x the real number lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
τ(x,Eix) =
∞∑
i=1
τ(x,Eix) = τ(x,
∞⋃
i=1
Eix) is also
measurable.
(ii). According to the Monotone Convergence Theorem we have
λ∗(
∞⋃
i=1
Ei) =
∞∑
i=1
λ∗(Ei) = lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
λ∗(Ei)
= lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
∫
X
τ(x,Eix) µ(dx)
=
∫
X
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
τ(x,Eix) µ(dx)
=
∫
X
τ(x,
∞⋃
i=1
Eix) µ(dx)
=
∫
X
τ(x, (
∞⋃
i=1
Ei)x) µ(dx).
Hence, N is a σ-field. Furthermore, it is clear that for every A ∈ Σ1 and B ∈ Σ2, A×B ∈ N . Since
the product σ-field Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 is the smallest σ-field that contains Σ1 × Σ2, we have Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 = N .
Therefore, λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x,Ex) µ(dx) for every set E ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2.
Now, we complete the proof of the theorem. We just proved that for every set E ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 we
have ∫
X×Y
1E dλ
∗ = λ∗(E) =
∫
X
τ(x,Ex) µ(dx) =
∫
X
∫
Y
1Ex τ(x, dy) µ(dx).
Hence, it is clear that for any bounded and measurable step function φ on X × Y we have∫
X×Y
φ dλ∗ =
∫
X
∫
Y
φx τ(x, dy)µ(dx) =
∫
X
∫
Y
φ τ(x, dy)µ(dx),
where φx(y) = φ(x, y). Let f : X × Y → R be a bounded and measurable function with respect to
the σ-field Σ1⊗Σ2. Then, there is a sequence of bounded and measurable step functions {φn}∞n=1
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such that φn ↑ f pointwisely. Thus, by the Monotone Convergence Theorem we have∫
X×Y
f dλ∗ =
∫
X×Y
lim
n→∞φ
n dλ∗
= lim
n→∞
∫
X×Y
φn dλ∗
= lim
n→∞
∫
X
∫
Y
φn τ(x, dy)µ(dx)
=
∫
X
∫
Y
lim
n→∞φ
n τ(x, dy)µ(dx)
=
∫
X
∫
Y
f τ(x, dy)µ(dx).
7 Appendix II: Proofs for the auction in Section 5
Throughout the Appendix.2, we will use the notion Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) for bidder 2’s expected profit
given his type t2 and bid b2 against a strategy τ1 of bidder 1. If bidder 1 makes a bid b1 > b2, then
bidder 2 does not win the object and has zero profit. Therefore, if bidding b2 against τ1 leads to a
tie with zero ex-ante probability, then we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) τ1(t1, db1) dt1. (6)
Since the function 5 + t2 − αt1 − b1 is bounded on [0, 1] × [5 − α, 6] and measurable with respect
to T × A, then according to Theorem 27, Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) is well-defined.
In the special case when τ1 is a deterministic strategy, i.e. when τ1(t1, ·) = δp1(t1)(·) for a pure
strategy p1, we have∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) τ1(t1, db1) =
{
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) if p1(t1) ∈ [5− α, b2]
0 if p1(t1) ∈ (b2, 6].
Hence, if p1 is increasing and b2 ∈ p1(T1), then we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1. (7)
7.1 Proof of Proposition 19
We prove that the deterministic strategy profile β = (β1, β2) in which βi corresponds to the pure
strategy Bi(ti) = 5 + (1 − α)ti for each bidder i, is a BNE. For this purpose, we prove that β2 is
a best response against β1. Then, due to symmetry, β1 is also a best response against β2, and the
proof will be complete.
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According to (7), if b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] then we have
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ B−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 −B1(t1)) dt1
=
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
=
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(t2 − t1) dt1
= t2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
− 1
2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)2
.
By taking the first derivative with respect to b2
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
t2
1− α −
1
1− α
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
.
It is clear that
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, 5) ≥ 0 and
d
db2
Eβ1(Π2 | t2, 6− α) ≤ 0,
which implies that the maximum of Eβ1(Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6−α] is attained where ddb2Eβ1(Π2 |
t2, b2) = 0. This happens exactly when
b2 = 5 + (1− α)t2 = B2(t2).
Notice that, for bidder 2, bidding less than 5 is never better than bidding 5 exactly, because all
bids less than or equal to 5 win against β1 with probability 0. Similarly, bidding more than 6−α is
never better than bidding 6−α exactly, because all bids larger than or equal to 6−α win against
β1 with probability 1. Therefore, β2 is a best response to β1 as claimed.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 20
Consider two pure strategies p1 and p2 that satisfy conditions (i), (ii) of Proposition 20, and the
corresponding deterministic strategies τ1 and τ2. Suppose that (τ1, τ2) is a BNE. Our goal is to
show that p1(t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1 and p2(t2) = 5 + (1− α)t2.
Notice that p1 : T1 → A1 and p2 : T2 → A2 are continuous and invertible, and therefore they have
a continuous inverse. Thus, because p1(T1) = p2(T2), the function pˆ = p
−1
1 ◦ p2 is well defined and
it is a continuous bijection from T2 to T1.
First we argue that p2(0) ≤ 5. Suppose by way of contradiction that p2(0) > 5. According to (7)
we have
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) =
∫ pˆ(t2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1.
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 29
Notice that if t2 > 0 then pˆ(t2) > 0 due to conditions (i) and (ii), and moreover, for every type
t2 < p2(0)− 5 we have
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) ≤ 5 + t2 − p1(t1) ≤ 5 + t2 − p1(0) = 5 + t2 − p2(0) < 0.
Therefore, Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) is strictly negative. However, as p1(0) = p2(0) > 5, bidder 2 can get
zero by bidding 5 for instance, which never wins. This is a contradiction with the assumption that
τ2 is a best response to τ1, so p2(0) ≤ 5 holds indeed.
Now we prove that p2(1) ≥ 6 − α. Write c := 6 − α − p2(1) and suppose by way of contradiction
that c > 0. According to (7), if we compare bids p2(1) and p2(t2) for bidder 2 when his type is t2,
we obtain
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(1))− Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) =
∫ 1
pˆ(t2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1.
Notice that if t2 ∈ (1− c, 1), then pˆ(t2) < 1 due to conditions (i) and (ii), and moreover, for every
t1 ∈ [0, 1] we have
5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1) ≥ 5 + t2 − α− p1(1)
= 5 + t2 − α− p2(1)
= 5 + t2 − α+ c− 6 + α
= −1 + t2 + c
> 0.
Therefore, for every t2 ∈ (1− c, 1)
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(1))− Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(t2)) > 0,
which is in contradiction with the assumption that τ2 is a best response to τ1. Hence, p2(1) ≥ 6−α
holds indeed.
Now, we calculate bidder 2’s best response bids against τ1, given his type t2. It is clear that, for
any type t2, bidding p2(0) is not worse than any bid in [5 − α, p2(0)], because all these bids win
with probability zero against τ1. Similarly, bidding p2(1) is not worse than any bid in [p2(1), 6],
because all these bids win with probability 1 against τ1. It remains to determine the best bids in
the interval [p2(0), p2(1)], which we do by examining the derivative of Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) with respect
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 30
to b2. By (7), we have for every bid b2 ∈ [p2(0), p2(1)] that
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − p1(t1)) dt1
=
[
(5 + t2)t1 − α
2
t21
]p−11 (b2)
0
−
∫ p−11 (b2)
0
p1(t1) dt1
= (5 + t2)p
−1
1 (b2)−
α
2
(
p−11 (b2)
)2 − ∫ p−11 (b2)
0
p1(t1) dt1.
Therefore, the first derivative with respect to b2 is
d
db2
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) =
1
p′1
(
p−11 (b2)
) · (5 + t2 − αp−11 (b2))− 1
p′1
(
p−11 (b2)
)p1(p−11 (b2))
=
1
p′1
(
p−11 (b2)
) · (5 + t2 − αp−11 (b2)− b2) .
Because pˆ(0) = p−11 (p2(0)) = p
−1
1 (p1(0)) = 0 and p
′
1
(
p−11 (b2)
)
> 0 by conditions (i) and (ii), and
because p2(0) ≤ 5 we have for every t2 > 0 that
d
db2
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(0)) > 0. (8)
Similarly, because pˆ(1) = p−11 (p2(1)) = p
−1
1 (p1(1)) = 1 and p
′
1
(
p−11 (b2)
)
> 0 by conditions (i) and
(ii), and because p2(1) ≥ 6− α we have for every t2 < 1 that
d
db2
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, p2(1)) < 0. (9)
In view of (8) and (9), for all t2 ∈ (0, 1), each best response bid b2 in [p2(0), p2(1)] has to satisfy
d
db2
Eτ1(Π2 | t2, b2) = 0,
which is equivalent to
b2 = 5 + t2 − αp−11 (b2).
Because τ2 is a best response against τ1, we must have for every t2 ∈ (0, 1) that
p2(t2) = 5 + t2 − αp−11 (p2(t2)) = 5 + t2 − αpˆ(t2).
By continuity of p2 and pˆ, we obtain for all t2 ∈ [0, 1] that
p2(t2) = 5 + t2 − αpˆ(t2). (10)
With a similar argument for bidder 1, we have for all t1 ∈ [0, 1] that
p1(t1) = 5 + t1 − αpˆ−1(t1). (11)
By equation (11) we have for all t2 ∈ [0, 1] that
p1 (pˆ(t2)) = 5 + pˆ(t2)− αpˆ−1(pˆ(t2)),
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which yields p2(t2) = 5 + pˆ(t2)− αt2. Thus, by equation (10) we have
5 + pˆ(t2)− αt2 = 5 + t2 − αpˆ(t2),
which implies pˆ(t2) = t2. Hence, from (10) we derive that
p2(t2) = 5 + (1− α)t2,
and because of symmetry also that
p1(t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1,
so the proof of Proposition 20 is complete.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 24
Suppose that (b1, b2) is symmetric and deterministic, b1 = b2 is strictly increasing, and b1 is sincere
given b2. Since b1 = b2 by symmetry, and since b1 = b2 is strictly increasing, we have that
E(t2 | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = E(t2 | t1 > t2) = 1
2
t1.
So, since b1 is sincere given b2, using the above equality we have that
b1(t1) = E(v1(t1, t2) | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = E(5 + t1 − αt2 | b1(t1) > b2(t2)) = 5 + t1 − α
2
t1.
So, b1(t1) = 5 + t1 − α2 t1 and b2(t2) = 5 + t2 − α2 t2. This implies that (b1, b2) ∈ F. So, since
b1(t1) > B1(t1) for every type t1 > 0, Proposition 20 shows that (b1, b2) does not constitute a
BNE.
It is worthwhile to mention that even if we look at the situation in which bidder 1 naively bids his
ex ante expected valuation, the same conclusion holds. In that case bidder 1’s expected evaluation
of the object given his type t1 is
E(v1(t1, t2) | t1) = E(5 + t1 − αt2 | t1) = 5 + t1 − α
2
,
and the same reasoning as before shows that also this does not yield a BNE.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 25
We prove that neither bidder has a dominant strategy. To this end we prove that every strategy
σi of player i = 1, 2 is not dominant. Suppose σ2 is a dominant strategy for bidder 2. Notice
that if bidder 1 chooses strategy β1 and if bidder 2 is given type t2 ∈ (0, 1), then bidding β2 is
bidder 2’s unique best response (see the proof of Proposition 19). This implies that σ2 = β2. Now
we show that the strategies β2 is not in dominant strategies. To this end we show that β2 is not
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a best response against all strategies of bidder 1. Suppose that bidder 1’s strategy is given by
λ1(t1, ·) = δb1(t1)(·) for every t1 ∈ T1, where
b1(t1) =
{ 11
2 if t1 ∈ [0, 12 ]
6 if t1 ∈ ( 12 , 1].
We prove that if t2 =
1+α
2 , then β2 is not a best response for bidder 2 against λ1. Notice
that bidder 2 gets zero by bidding B2(
1+α
2 ), because it never wins against λ1 due to B2(
1+α
2 ) =
5 + (1 − α)( 1+α2 ) < 112 . However, by (7), bidder 2’s expected profit given type t2 = 1+α2 and
b2 ∈ ( 112 , 6) is
Eλ1(Π2 |
1 + α
2
, b2) =
∫ 1
2
0
(
5 +
1 + α
2
− αt1 − 11
2
)
dt1 =
α
8
> 0.
This shows that if t2 =
1+α
2 then bidding b2 ∈ ( 112 , 6) is strictly better than bidding B2( 1+α2 ).
Hence, β2 is not in dominant strategies. This proves that bidder 2 does not have a dominant
strategy at all, and by symmetry the same is true for bidder 1. The proof is complete.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 21
We prove that the BNE β = (β1, β2) is uniform-perfect. For this purpose, define the curves
CM , CT , CL : [0, 1]→ [5− α, 6] by
CM (t1) = 5 + (1− α)t1,
CT (t1) = 6− αt21,
CL(t1) = 5− α+ α(1− t1)2.
Let µ be the uniform distribution on A1 = [5 − α, 6]. For every k ∈ N, let εk = 1k+3 and
βk1 : T1 × A1 → [0, 1] be the completely mixed strategy for bidder 1 which is given for every
t1 ∈ T1 = [0, 1] by
βk1 (t1, ·) = (1− 2εk − ε2k) δCM (t1)(·) + εk δCT (t1)(·) + εk δCL(t1)(·) + ε2k µ(·).
Similarly, define a completely mixed strategy βk2 for bidder 2. We show that the sequence of
strategy profiles (βk)∞k=1 = (β
k
1 , β
k
2 )
∞
k=1 satisfies conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 7.
It is clear from the definition of βi(ti, ·) and βki (ti, ·), for each bidder i, that
sup
ti∈Ti
ρw(βki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 2εk + ε2k.
Hence, condition 1 of Definition 7 is satisfied. Condition 2 of Definition 7 follows from the claim
below.
Claim: For every ξ ∈ (0, α), there is a Kξ ∈ N such that for every k > Kξ we have:
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1. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 6] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5− ξ, 5 + 2ξ(1− α)].
2. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [CM (t2)− ξ(1− α), CM (t2) + ξ(1− α)].
3. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2ξ(1− α), 6− α+ ξ].
The above claim is illustrated in Figure 1. According to the claim, the gray area includes all best
response bids for bidder 2 if k > Kξ.
b2
t2
5
5 − α
5 − ξ
5 + 2ξ(1 − α)
6 − α
6
6 − α + ξ
6 − α − 2ξ(1 − α)
0 1ξ 1 − ξ
CM
Figure 1: bidder 2’s best response bids
Take an arbitrary ξ ∈ (0,min{α, 12}). To prove this claim, it is enough to show that the following
claims 1, 2 and 3 are valid. These claims corresponds to three cases, i.e., 6 − α ≤ b2 ≤ 6,
5− α ≤ b2 ≤ 5 and 5 ≤ b2 ≤ 6− α.
Claim 1: for the case 6− α ≤ b2 ≤ 6
There is an M1ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M1ξ we have:
1. For every t2 ∈ [0, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6 − α, 6] is attained at
b2 = 6− α.
2. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6 − α, 6] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α, 6− α+ ξ].
Claim 2: for the case 5− α ≤ b2 ≤ 5
There is an M2ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M2ξ we have:
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1. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 5] is attained at b2 = 5.
2. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5−α, 5] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5− ξ, 5].
Claim 3: for case 5 ≤ b2 ≤ 6− α
There is an M3ξ ∈ N such that for every k > M3ξ we have:
1. For every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ], the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6 − α] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [CM (t2)− ξ(1− α), CM (t2) + ξ(1− α)].
2. For every t2 ∈ [0, ξ), the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6−α] can only be attained
within b2 ∈ [5, 5 + 2ξ(1− α)].
3. For every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5, 6 − α] can only be
attained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2ξ(1− α), 6− α].
It is important to note that Part (1) of Claim 1 shows that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1− ξ], the maximum
of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [6− α, 6] is not more than the maximum over b2 ∈ [5, 6− α], which is
verified in Claim 3. Similarly, Part (1) of Claim 2 indicates that for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1], the maximum
of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) over b2 ∈ [5− α, 5] is not more than the maximum over b2 ∈ [5, 6− α].
Proof of Claim 1: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [6−α, 6]. Note that C
−1
T (b2) ∈ [0, 1]
is the unique type t1 for bidder 1 such that CT (t1) = b2. By the definition of CT , we have
C−1T (b2) =
√
6−b2
α . Therefore, by (6)
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1
=
∫ C−1T (b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1 I
+
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1. II
From the definition of βk1 (t1, ·) we obtain
I = (1− 2εk − ε2k)
∫ C−1T (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ C−1T (b2)
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ C−1T (b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Behavioral Perfect equilibrium in Bayesian Games 35
Similarly, we have
II = (1− 2εk − ε2k)
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CT (t1)) dt1.
Hence, by the definition of the curves CM , CT , and CL we obtain
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = I + II = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ 1
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)2
)
dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 6 + αt21
)
dt1.
Thus,
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)(t2 −
1
2
) + εk(t2 +
α
6
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1T (b2)
(−1 + t2 − αt1 + αt21) dt1.
Note that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6− α)− Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6) = −
ε2k
1 + α
∫ 6
6−α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b1) db1
− εk
∫ 1
0
(−1 + t2 − αt1 + αt21) dt1
=
(
α
1 + α
)
ε2k(1− t2) + εk(1− t2 +
α
6
) > 0,
and also that Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) is continuous on the compact set (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α, 6]. Therefore,
there is a y > 0 (without loss of generality we can assume that y ∈ (0, α− ξ), in order to make the
analysis easier) such that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1] and b2 ∈ (6− y, 6]
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6− α) > Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2).
This means that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], bidding 6 − α is strictly better than any bid in the interval
(6− y, 6]. Hence, it suffices to prove Claim 1 over b2 ∈ [6− α, 6− y]. We do so by examining the
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first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2, which equals to
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = ε
2
k · q1(t2, b2) + εk · q2(t2, b2),
where
q1(t2, b2) =
1
1 + α
· (5 + t2 − α
2
− b2)
q2(t2, b2) =
1
2α · C−1T (b2)
· (−1 + t2 − αC−1T (b2) + α(C−1T (b2))2) .
Note that q2(t2, b2) is strictly negative for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1] × [6 − α, 6 − y] \ {(1, 6 − α)}, and
q2(1, 6− α) = 0.
Because q2 is strictly negative on the compact set [0, 1− ξ]× [6−α, 6−y], it has a strictly negative
upper-bound on [0, 1 − ξ] × [6 − α, 6 − y]. Therefore, since ε2k is relatively much smaller than εk
for sufficiently large k, then ddb2 Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) < 0 for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1− ξ]× [6−α, 6− y]. This
proves that there exists an N1ξ ∈ N such that for every k > N1ξ we have ddb2 Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) < 0
for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1− ξ]× [6− α, 6− y]. Hence, part (1) of Claim 1 holds for all k > N1ξ .
Because q2 is strictly negative on the compact set [1−ξ, 1]× [6−α+ξ, 6−y], we can apply a similar
argument and find an L1ξ ∈ N such that part (2) of Claim 1 holds for every k > L1ξ . Therefore, by
choosing M1ξ = max{N1ξ , L1ξ}, Claim 1 is valid for every k > M1ξ .
Proof of Claim 2: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [5 − α, 5]. Note that type
C−1L (b2) ∈ [0, 1] is the unique type t1 for bidder 1 such that CL(t1) = b2. By the definition of CL,
we have C−1L (b2) = 1−
√
b2−5
α + 1. Hence, by (6)
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) =
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1
=
∫ C−1L (b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1 III
+
∫ 1
C−1L (b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) βk1 (t1, db1) dt1. IV
Therefore, we have
III = ε2k
∫ C−1L (b2)
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1,
IV = εk
∫ 1
C−1L (b2)
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
C−1L (b2)
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
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Hence, by the definition of the curve CL we obtain
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = III + IV = ε
2
k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1L (b2)
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)2
)
dt1
=
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
C−1L (b2)
(t2 + αt1 − αt21) dt1.
Note that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5)− Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5− α) =
ε2k
1 + α
∫ 5
5−α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b1) db1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(t2 + αt1 − αt21) dt1
=
(
α
1 + α
)
ε2kt2 + εk(t2 +
α
6
) > 0,
and also that Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) is continuous on the compact set (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α, 5]. Therefore,
there is a y > 0 (similar to the previous case assume that y ∈ (0, α−ξ)) such that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1]
and b2 ∈ [5− α, 5− α+ y)
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5) > Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2).
This means that for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], bidding 5 is strictly better than any bid in the interval
[5− α, 5− α+ y). Hence, it suffices to prove Claim 2 over the interval [5− α+ y, 5]. We do so by
examining the first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2, which equals to
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = ε
2
kp1(t2, b2) + εkp2(t2, b2),
where
p1(t2, b2) =
1
1 + α
· (5 + t2 − α
2
− b2),
p2(t2, b2) =
1
2α · (1− C−1L (b2))
· (t2 + αC−1L (b2)0− αC−1L (b2)2).
Note that p2(t2, b2) is strictly positive for all (t2, b2) ∈ [0, 1]×[5−α+y, 5]\{(0, 5)}, and p2(0, 5) = 0.
With an argument similar to that of the previous case, we can find an M2ξ such that for every
k > M2ξ Claim 2 is valid.
Proof of Claim 3: We compute Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) for every b2 ∈ [5, 6−α]. Note that C
−1
M (b2) =
b2−5
1−α
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for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α]. With a similar argument as before we have
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CM (t1)) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − CL(t1)) dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Hence, by the definition of the curves CM and CL we obtain
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(5 + t2 − αt1 − 5− (1− α)t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
5 + t2 − αt1 − 5 + α− α(1− t1)2
)
dt1
+ ε2k
∫ 1
0
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − αt1 − b1) µ(db1) dt1.
Thus,
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = (1− 2εk − ε
2
k)
∫ b2−5
1−α
0
(t2 − t1) dt1
+ εk
∫ 1
0
(
t2 + αt1 − αt21
)
dt1
+
ε2k
1 + α
∫ b2
5−α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b1) db1
= (1− 2εk − ε2k)
(
t2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)
− 1
2
(
b2 − 5
1− α
)2)
+ εk(t2 +
α
6
)
+
ε2k
2(1 + α)
(b2 − 5 + α)(5 + 2t2 − b2).
So, the first derivative of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) with respect to b2 is
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2)
=
1− 2εk − ε2k
1− α ·
(
t2 − b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(5 + t2 − α
2
− b2). (12)
First, we prove that for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1 − ξ] the maximum of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) cannot be attained
on the boundary of interval [5, 6− α]. Observe that
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5) =
1− 2εk − ε2k
1− α · t2 +
ε2k
1 + α
(t2 − α
2
),
and
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6− α) =
1− 2εk − ε2k
1− α · (t2 − 1) +
ε2k
1 + α
(t2 − 1 + α
2
).
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Hence, there is an N3ξ ∈ N such that if k > N3ξ then for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1− ξ] we have
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 5) > 0
and
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, 6− α) < 0.
Therefore, by the continuity of Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2), we can conclude for every t2 ∈ [ξ, 1− ξ] that if b2
maximizes Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2), then
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | t2, b2) = 0. (13)
One can check with the help of (12) that the unique solution of (13), for every t2 ∈ [0, 1], is
b2(t2) =
(1− 2εk − ε2k)(1 + α)
v(εk)
· (5 + (1− α)t2) + ε
2
k(1− α)2
v(εk)
(5 + t2 − α
2
),
where
v(εk) = (1− 2εk − ε2k)(1 + α) + ε2k(1− α)2.
One can verify that
|b2(t2)− CM (t2)| = αε
2
k(1− α)2
v(εk)
∣∣∣∣t2 − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ αε2k(1− α)22v(εk) .
Therefore, there is an L3ξ ∈ N such that for every k > L3ξ and every t2 ∈ [0, 1] we have
|b2(t2)− CM (t2)| ≤ ξ(1− α).
By choosing M3ξ = max{N3ξ , L3ξ}, for every k > M3ξ , part (1) of Claim 3 is valid.
Since at t2 = 0, for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] we have
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | 0, b2) =
1− 2εk − ε2k
1− α ·
(
−b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(5− α
2
− b2) < 0,
the maximum at t2 = 0 is obtained at b2 = 5. Moreover, by part (1) of Claim 3 we have that if
k > max{N3ξ , L3ξ}, then for t2 = ξ the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [5, 5 + 2(1 − α)ξ]. One
can verify that in (12), the first derivative of unique solution b2(t2) is strictly positive, then we can
conclude that for every t2 ∈ [0, ξ) the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [5, 5+2(1−α)ξ], for large
k.
With a similar argument, since at t2 = 1 for every b2 ∈ [5, 6− α] we have
d
db2
Eβk1 (Π2 | 1, b2) =
1− 2εk − ε2k
1− α ·
(
1− b2 − 5
1− α
)
+
ε2k
1 + α
(6− α
2
− b2) > 0,
the maximum at t2 = 1 is obtained in b2 = 6 − α. Moreover, if k > max{N3ξ , L3ξ}, then for
t2 = 1− ξ the maximum is obtained within b2 ∈ [6− α− 2(1− α)ξ, 6− α]. Similarly, since b2′(t2)
is strictly positive, we conclude that for every t2 ∈ (1 − ξ, 1] the maximum is obtained within
b2 ∈ [6− α− 2(1− α)ξ, 6− α] for large k. This complete the proof of Claim 3, for every k > M3ξ .
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7.6 Proofs of Propositions 22 and 23
It is easy to check that strategy profiles σ and η are BNEs.
We now prove that the BNE σ = (σ1, σ2), in which σ1(t1, ·) = δ6(·) and σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·), is not
pointwise-perfect, consequently is not uniform-perfect. Let (σk1 )
∞
k=1 be a sequence of completely
mixed strategies for bidder 1 such that ρw(σk1 , σ1) −→ 0 as k →∞. We show that bidder’s 2 best
response against σk1 does not converge to σ2 when k →∞.
Suppose that bidder 1 plays σk1 , for some k ∈ N. We prove that for t2 = 1, the best response of
bidder 2 is far from σ2(t2, ·) = δ5−α(·). Note that bidder 2 gets always zero by choosing σ2, because
he never wins. So, it is enough to show that his expected profit is strictly positive by bidding 6−α,
when t2 = 1. We compute bidder 2’s expected profit given type t2 = 1 and bid b2 = 6− α.
Eσk1 (Π2 | 1, 6− α) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(5 + 1− αt1 − b1) σk1 (t1, db1) dt1.
Since σk1 is a completely mixed strategy we have σ
k
1 (t1, (5− α, 6− α)) > 0, therefore by using the
fact that b1 ∈ (5− α, 6− α) we have
Eσk1 (Π2 | 1, 6− α) >
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(5 + 1− αt1 − 6 + α) σk1 (t1, db1) dt1
= α
∫ 1
0
∫ 6−α
5−α
(1− t1) σk1 (t1, db1) dt1 ≥ 0.
This implies that Eσk1 (Π2 | 1, 6− α) > 0, hence σ2 is not pointwise-perfect.
With a similar argument, one can prove that the discontinuous BNE η is not pointwise-perfect,
and hence not uniform-perfect either.
8 Appendix III: A measurability result for the weak dis-
tance
A metric space (X, d) is called σ-compact, if X is a countable union of compact subsets of X.
A strategy βi for some player i is called simple if there exists a finite set B ⊆ Ai such that
βi(ti, B) = 1 for every ti ∈ Ti.
Lemma 28 Assume that the action space Ai is σ-compact for a player i ∈ N . Then, for every
strategy βi for player i, there exists a sequence (τ
k
i )
∞
k=1 of simple strategies such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(τki (ti, ·), βi(ti, ·)) = 0 (14)
for every type ti ∈ Ti.
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Proof.
Part 1: The definition of the sequence (τki )
∞
k=1: Since Ai is σ-compact, Ai = ∪∞j=1Kj for
some compact sets Kj ⊆ Ai. Let Aki = ∪kj=1Kj for every k ∈ N. Note that Aki is compact for every
k ∈ N, the sequence (Aki )∞k=1 is increasing and Ai = ∪∞k=1Aki .
Take a k ∈ N. For every a ∈ Aki , let Uk(a) = {a′ ∈ Ai | dAi(a, a′) < 1k}. Since Aki is compact,
there exist actions ak1 , . . . , a
k
Jk ∈ Aki such that
Aki ⊆
Jk⋃
j=1
Uk(akj ).
Define Bk1 = U
k(ak1)∩Aki , and Bkj =
[
Uk(akj ) ∩Aki
]\∪j−1=1Uk(ak ) for every j = 2, . . . , Jk. Without
loss of generality we can assume, for every j, that Bkj is non-empty; otherwise we could leave out a
k
j
from the list ak1 , . . . , a
k
Jk . Thus, {Bk1 , . . . , BkJk} forms a partition of Aki . Moreover, by construction,
Bkj ∈ Ai for every j = 1, . . . , Jk. Take an arbitrary bkj ∈ Bkj for every j = 1, . . . , Jk.
Now define the simple strategy τki for player i by
τki (ti, ·) = βi(ti, Bk1 ) · δbk1 (·) + . . .+ βi(ti, B
k
Jk) · δbk
Jk
(·) + (1− βi(ti, Aki )) · δbk1 (·)
for every ti ∈ Ti, where as usual, δ stands for the Dirac measure. Note that τki satisfies condition
(2) of the definition of behavior strategies. The last term in the definition of τki (ti, ·) will not play
an important role, but it is needed so that τki (ti, ·) is a probability measure.
Part 2: The proof that the sequence (τki )
∞
k=1 satisfies equality (14): Fix a type ti ∈ Ti.
Consider a bounded Lipschitz function f : Ai → R. Then, there exist C1, C2 ≥ 0 such that
|f(a)| ≤ C1 and |f(a)− f(a′)| ≤ C2 · dAi(a, a′) for every a, a′ ∈ Ai. Let
Dk =
∣∣∣∣∫
Ai
f(a) τki (ti, da)−
∫
Ai
f(a) βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣ .
Since ∫
Ai
f(a) τki (ti, da) =
Jk∑
j=1
f(bkj ) · βi(ti, Bkj ) + f(bk1) · (1− βi(ti, Aki ))
and ∫
Ai
f(a) βi(ti, da) =
Jk∑
j=1
∫
Bkj
f(a) βi(ti, da) +
∫
Ai\Aki
f(a) βi(ti, da),
we have
Dk ≤
Jk∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣f(bkj ) · βi(ti, Bkj )−
∫
Bkj
f(a) βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2C1 · (1− βi(ti, Aki ))
≤
Jk∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bkj
[
f(bkj )− f(a)
]
βi(ti, da)
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2C1 · (1− βi(ti, Aki ))
≤
Jk∑
j=1
sup
a∈Bkj
∣∣f(bkj )− f(a)∣∣ · βi(ti, Bkj ) + 2C1 · (1− βi(ti, Aki )).
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Since the diameter of Bkj , for each j = 1, . . . , J
k, is at most 2k , it follows that
Dk ≤
Jk∑
j=1
2
k
· C2 · βi(ti, Bkj ) + 2C1 · (1− βi(ti, Aki ))
=
2
k
· C2 · βi(ti, Aki ) + 2C1 · (1− βi(ti, Aki )).
By the continuity of the measure, βi(ti, A
k
i ) converges to βi(ti, Ai) = 1 as k → ∞, and hence Dk
converges to zero as k →∞. As f was an arbitrary bounded Lipschitz function from Ai to R, the
proof of (14) is complete. 
Lemma 29 Assume that the action space Ai is σ-compact for a player i ∈ N , and let β1i and β2i be
two strategies for player i. Then, the function f : Ti → R defined by f(ti) = ρw(β1i (ti, ·), β2i (ti, ·))
is measurable.
Proof. It suffices to prove that the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is measurable for every r ∈ R. So, fix
an arbitrary r ∈ R.
Part 1: when β1i and β
2
i are simple strategies.
First assume that β1i and β
2
i are simple strategies. Then, there are finite sets B
1, B2 ⊆ Ai such
that β1i (ti, B
1) = 1 and β2i (ti, B
2) = 1 for every ti ∈ Ti. Let B = B1 ∪B2. We have
f(ti) = inf
{
ε > 0 | β1i (ti, C) ≤ β2i (ti, Cε) + ε and β2i (ti, C) ≤ β1i (ti, Cε) + ε ∀C ∈ Ai
}
.
Notice that if β1i (ti, C) ≤ β2i (ti, Cε)+ε for some C ⊆ B, then for any C˜ ∈ Ai satisfying C˜∩B = C,
we obtain
β1i (ti, C˜) = β
1
i (ti, C) ≤ β2i (ti, Cε) + ε ≤ β2i (ti, C˜ε) + ε.
Similarly, if β2i (ti, C) ≤ β1i (ti, Cε) + ε then
β2i (ti, C˜) ≤ β1i (ti, C˜ε) + ε.
Hence,
f(ti) = inf
{
ε > 0 | β1i (ti, C) ≤ β2i (ti, Cε) + ε and β2i (ti, C) ≤ β1i (ti, Cε) + ε ∀C ⊆ B
}
.
Notice that f(ti) > r holds if and only if there exists an m ∈ N and a set C ⊆ B such that for
ε = r + 1m we have either β
1
i (ti, C) > β
2
i (ti, C
ε) + ε or β2i (ti, C) > β
1
i (ti, C
ε) + ε. Indeed, the
“only if”-part is immediate, whereas the “if”-part follows from the fact that β2i (ti, C
ε) + ε and
β1i (ti, C
ε) + ε are increasing in ε.
For every m ∈ N and C ⊆ B, define
U1m,C =
{
ti ∈ Ti |β1i (ti, C) > β2i (ti, Cr+
1
m ) + r +
1
m
}
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U2m,C =
{
ti ∈ Ti |β2i (ti, C) > β1i (ti, Cr+
1
m ) + r +
1
m
}
.
Since by condition (2) of the definition of behavior strategies, the section functions β1i (·, C) : Ti → R
and β2i (·, Cr+
1
m ) : Ti → R are measurable, the sets U1m,C are measurable. For a similar reason, the
sets U2m,C are measurable too. Now we have
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} =
∞⋃
m=1
⋃
C⊆B
[
U1m,C
⋃
U2m,C
]
.
Because the right hand side is a countable union of measurable sets, the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is
measurable as well. So, the claim of the lemma holds for simple strategies.
Part 2: when β1i and β
2
i are arbitrary strategies.
Now we prove the lemma for arbitrary strategies β1i and β
2
i . By Lemma 28, there are two sequences
of simple strategies (τk,1i )
∞
k=1 and (τ
k,2
i )
∞
k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), β1i (ti, ·)) = 0, and lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,2i (ti, ·), β2i (ti, ·)) = 0
for every type ti ∈ Ti. By the definition of f , we have
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} = {ti ∈ Ti | lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τk,2i (ti, ·)) > r}.
Notice that, for some ti ∈ Ti, the inequality
lim
k→∞
ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τk,2i (ti, ·)) > r
holds if and only if there exists an m ∈ N such that ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τk,2i (ti, ·)) > r + 1m holds for
sufficiently large k. Therefore,
{ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} =
∞⋃
m=1
∞⋃
=1
∞⋂
k=
{
ti ∈ Ti | ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τk,2i (ti, ·)) > r +
1
m
}
.
For each k ∈ N, because the strategies τk,1i and τk,2i are simple, part 1 of the proof implies that set{
ti ∈ Ti | ρw(τk,1i (ti, ·), τk,2i (ti, ·)) > r +
1
m
}
is measurable. Therefore, the set {ti ∈ Ti | f(ti) > r} is measurable as well. 
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